The Next Development in Man Read online

  THE NEXT DEVELOPMENT IN MAN

  by

  Lancelot Law Whyte

  THE

  Next Development

  in Man

  By the same author

  ARCHIMEDES, OR THE FUTURE OF PHYSICS

  (1927)

  CRITIQUE OF PHYSICS

  (1931)

  THE

  Next Development

  in Man

  LANCELOT LAW WHYTE

  NEW YORK: HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

  Copyright © 1948, by Lancelot Law Whyte

  Printed in the United States of America

  First Printing

  To the memory of

  LOTTE

  ACKNOWLEDGMENT

  My thanks are due to E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. for permission to

  quote on page 213 from the translation by John Veitch of Descartes'

  "Discourse on Method and Meditation on the First Philosophy" and on page

  228 from the translation by John Oxenford of Eckermann's "Conversations

  with Goethe," both published in the United States in the Everyman Library.

  L. L. W.

  Preface to U. S. Edition

  In the foreword written in May 1943 I undertook to make it known if I

  ever came to doubt the argument of this book or discovered errors in

  its development.

  I wish therefore to confirm that these years have strengthened my

  conviction that if civilization is not to decline during the coming

  decades it can be only through the development of a universal method

  of thought providing the basis for a unified humane science and for a

  world society. A humane science is one which would show man the right

  way to think in order to understand nature and life, including himself,

  and would thus further the development of a world community. Today only

  such a science can speak with universal authority.

  I believe that what is needed is a 'language of process" supported

  by the authority of science, and that the conception of process as the

  development of form outlined in Chapter 2, or similar ideas, will acquire

  this sanction during the coming years by leading to a unification of

  sciences of matter, life, and mind.

  In this book I have suggested that the deepest troubles of western

  civilization can be regarded as due to the fact that it had relied on a

  language of permanence, in which, following Plato, only the unchanging

  is real. For two centuries the West has been struggling to create a

  valid language of process -- witness Hegel, Marx, Bergson, and Whitehead,

  amongst others. But this task cannot be completed without the aid of exact

  science, which has only recently begun to question the permanence of its

  fundamental particles, and to search for an adequate concept of process.

  As physics was not ready to speak the authoritative word, I wrote this

  book as an exercise in a new language of process. It is thus an attempt

  to develop a method of thought based on a new concept of process,

  and at the same time to interpret the failure of the West as due to

  its lack of this method and its use of concepts of permanence which

  led to spurious dualisms. My next work applies the same unintellectual

  method to outline a theory of organism, for it is in living processes

  that the development of form is clearest. The results appear to me to

  establish the scientific value of the method, though this view awaits

  the confirmation of specialists.

  Thus what was an unsupported intuition when in 1937 I began to think

  out the argument of this book has now in 1947 become for me a tested

  conviction. On this central issue I have therefore nothing to withdraw. I

  remain vividly aware of the oversimplification of some historical

  passages, and of the inadequacy of my scholarship to so comprehensive

  a theme. I also regret that I was not able to include a discussion of

  the work of Bergson, Jung, and Whitehead, to whom I owe much. But these

  blemishes have not prevented a response which shows that I am one of

  many who share the same general view.

  There is however one topic on which I would express myself differently

  today. I think it is wrong to suggest that Russia has gone furthest

  towards a unitary society, even if following a path appropriate only

  to her. World order implies a unity tolerant of diversity; truth,

  justice, and the welfare of man depend on individuals with the courage

  and opportunity to express their varied opinions. It was the freedom

  of the West which nourished Marx and Lenin, and so made possible the

  transformation which created Soviet Russia. The fate of mankind in the

  coming decades may be profoundly influenced by thinkers in the West using

  their freedom to find means of overcoming the doctrinal conflicts which

  have so aggravated the ancient isolation of Russia from the West. This

  can only be done by discovering a universal method of thought appropriate

  to the present stage in the development of man. I here make an attempt in

  this direction; may there be many more, until a unitary science compels

  attention of the race to a way of thinking which can unite mankind.

  L.L.W.

  London, July 1947.

  Contents

  Preface vii

  Foreword xi

  I Introduction 1

  II Development 25

  III The Characteristics of Man 47

  IV European Man 73

  V The European Tradition 100

  VI Europe after 1600 128

  VII The Twentieth Century 166

  VIII Nine Thinkers:

  Heraclitus, Plato, Paul, Kepler, Descartes 190

  IX Nine Thinkers (continued):

  Spinoza, Goethe, Marx, Freud 216

  X Unitary Man 246

  XI The World Trend 278

  Postscript 306

  Appendix: Glossary of Unitary Thought 312

  Index 317

  Foreword

  To be alive is to undergo ceaseless change. Man fears change and

  seeks to deny it by imposing on it a principle of permanence. That may

  offer the illusion of escape, but it cannot bring understanding. To

  understand nature, and himself, man must accept change and identify

  the universal form of process which underlies the variety of particular

  processes. Understanding means the recognition of the simple form common

  to all change. Man does not know nature or himself until he has discovered

  this underlying unity.

  I have long been convinced that the clue to the unity of nature lies

  in a principle of development. Countless processes of the inorganic

  and organic worlds, of social history and the individual life, display

  development of various kinds. But this conviction sprang less from

  particular examples than from a sense of the general form of process. It

  seemed to me that change consisted in the development of form. Before I

  had any direct contact with the thought of Heraclitus, Goethe, Hegel, or

  Marx I had begun to develop this sense of the form of process by applying

  it unconsciously in daily life. Thus I gradually formed a unitary outlook,


  seeking the unity beneath diversity in a universal form of process. This

  attitude developed with the slow continuity of a plant growth.

  Then, as the outlook began to acquire definite shape, I found to my

  delight that others had already followed a similar path, and I hoped

  that the assurance so gained would bear fruit in the application of the

  method to special scientific problems. But I was not able to convert

  the intuitive conviction into a scientific method suited to the physical

  problems with which I was then concerned. There seemed to be no adequate

  bridge between the vague conception of a universal process of development

  and the system of exact science, so powerfully justified by its unique

  achievements. It appeared that an adequate basis for the unitary method

  could only be established by undertaking the most comprehensive task

  of all: the development of the general system of thought appropriate

  to contemporary man, which can extend his understanding of nature and

  therefore of himself. But this seemed to demand leisure and capacities

  which were not available.

  Yet as the years passed I realized that for good or ill I had my own

  criterion of truth. I might distrust all else, but not this sense whose

  origins seemed to lie outside me. I could not deny the sense that in

  my thought a general truth was finding expression. Time and scholarship

  were less necessary if all I had to do was to trust this criterion and

  allow it to use me as its editor and scribe.

  As I watched the world drifting towards renewed disaster my scepticism

  lost its force. Events seemed to be catching up on me; the general need

  for a reorganization of life and thought would soon be widely recognized;

  I had no reason to hesitate if the world was in so grave a plight. My

  conviction grew deeper and rooted itself in a developing interpretation of

  science and of history. The method which I was maturing was in accordance

  with the historical trend. The first task was to use the method to show

  why it is now appropriate. A unitary interpretation of the process that

  has brought man to his present situation must precede the development

  of a unitary science.

  Man's chief asset is his ability to discover a form of truth on

  which others may build. If what follows cannot contribute to

  science, let it perish unremembered. Yet the expression of a

  positive view must be dogmatic. The structure of language itself

  involves dogmatism, more dangerous because concealed. Here I

  make one explicit assertion, and show that it leads, not of logical

  necessity but by its own proper development, to an interpretation

  of the present disorganization of man and of his thought. If at

  any time I come to doubt the assertion, or discover errors in its

  development, I undertake to make this known.

  L.L.W.

  London. May, 1943

  xiii

  CRATYLUS: However, I assure you, Socrates, that I have already

  considered the matter, and after toilsome consideration I

  think the doctrine of Heraclitus is much more likely to be true.

  SOCRATES: Some other time, then, my friend, you will teach me,

  when you come back.

  I

  Introduction

  Thought is born of failure. When action satisfies there is no residue to hold the attention; to think is to confess a lack of adjustment which we must stop to consider. Only when the human organism fails to achieve an adequate response to its situation is there material for the processes of thought, and the greater the failure the more searching they become.

  At critical moments in the life of an individual the task of thought is to form a novel response which may permit further development. Similar moments occur in the history of communities when the failure of an old order provides unique material for thought. The new social forms which are in course of development may then suddenly become definite as ideas in the minds of individuals.

  Confucius is the first clear example of a man in this situation. Concerned at the disintegration of primitive Chinese civilization, he sought to restore order by relying on the power of ideas to organize behavior. He was aware of what he was trying to do: society was to be set right by calling everything by its right name, or as he put it, by the "rectification of names." In Greece a century later Socrates and Plato found themselves in a similar situation, and made the same attempt. Pagan civilization was disappearing. Under the growing complexity of social conditions the unthinking acceptance of traditional forms had given place to scepticism and conflict. It seemed that men could only be guided to right living by the clarification of their ideas.

  Beneath the similarity of these parallel attempts lay the contrast of East and West. The vast continental uniformity of Asia did not provide the stimulus of variety and permitted a static mode of life challenged only by the hopeless recurrence of drought and famine. In consequence the system of Confucius was traditional, dogmatic, and fatalistic. But along the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean, and later on the small, sea-girt continent of Europe, a diversity of conditions stimulated attention to differences and encouraged the improvement of thought by comparison and practical test. Confucius sought to restore the true way of life, Socrates to discover it.

  The fact that these men are still remembered today means less that their efforts influenced the general course of history than that the general course influenced them. Whatever is arbitrary or merely personal in the thought of any individual has a negligible influence on others. Ideas are only effective in so far as they are appropriate to particular phases of man's development; they dominate the mental processes and behavior of men so long as they facilitate that development. The influence of Confucius has persisted because his emphasis on traditional forms was for long appropriate to the slowly changing structure of Chinese life. The Platonic system has so far dominated Europe and the West because, as we shall see, the use of static concepts abstracted from the world of process provided, until recently, an adequate stimulus to the continued development of European and western civilization.

  But today the human community throughout the globe is once more in the course of a far-reaching transformation. The material conditions of society have changed in parallel with the advance of knowledge and the premises of ancient thought are no longer appropriate. Though it may be felt more in the West, the need for a new form of thought is universal. Whether or not the present degree of disorganization and conflict is greater than at similar moments in the past, there is now a more extensive awareness of it. This sense of frustration through disorganization can only be overcome by the development of the particular form of thought which is appropriate to this stage in the social development of man. If the present phase is to issue in a successful reorganization, the development of the new forms of community life must be facilitated by their symbolization in this new form of thought.

  This means that individuals may now again be led to direct their thought to the clarification of general ideas. Such reorganization of thought is a continuous process, and new formulations are a regular feature of every civilization. Yet we shall see that in certain respects the present phase is comparable only with the centuries from 600 to 400 B.C. when a particular form of self-consciousness first became widespread and influenced the social tradition. Now, as then, the species is passing through a transformation of such wide implications that it eludes ordinary sociological interpretation and can only be understood as a biological process. The ideas appropriate to such moments of reorganization are of universal significance. They appear as the result of the influence of the general situation on the indi
viduals who happen to conceive them, and once formulated they become part of the universal human tradition. In so far as such ideas are universal their source is also universal, though the limitations of any particular formulation may reflect the limitations of the individual who gives them expression.

  Yet however compelling may be the influence of the present situation on a suitably placed individual, a new system of thought cannot appear through an arbitrary act of creation. Just as a new social system cannot replace an earlier without systematic preparation, so an individual cannot undertake the task of a general reorganization of thought unless he is guided by a rational method based on past experience. Though the processes determining the development of thought are not yet understood, there is always a point at which reason can be applied to assist this development. The continuity of the development of thought is such that even when all established methods are recognized to be invalid and a general reorganization is seen to be necessary, there nevertheless exists a rational method of stepping from the old to the new. The selection of the new method may not he a rational or conscious process, but a rational transition must be possible if the continuity of the social tradition is to be preserved.

  A form of thought is required which can throw light on the present state of man and facilitate his further development. This new method must be reached by a rational development of ideas from some existing field of knowledge offering an analog to man's present situation. The contemporary situation is beyond the scope of historical analogy. Local civilizations have often displayed cycles of development and decay and the example of one may therefore aid the interpretation of another. But the cumulative influence of exact science and the enhanced interdependence of all communities have given western civilization a special status in the secular history of the species. Western life and thought is not a passing episode in a cycle of only local relevance; it is a phase in the general development of man. A diagnosis of the present state of western civilization cannot rest on historical analogy, but must arise from an interpretation of the general trend of human history.